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Industrialization 
Industrialization refers to economic change brought 
about by technology - technology powered by inanimate 
sources and capable of continuous development as a 
result of applied scientific research. 
Stanley Trapido (1) 
Nothing new? What a terrible misreading of the 
electricity] industry, S technological history this 
is. In the last 60 years alone the industry has gone 
from Carliss Engines of several hundred horsepower to 
one-million-horsepower turbines on a single shaft, 
from steam pressures of several atmospheres to supe* 
critical pressures of 200 and 300 atmospheres, from 
thermal efficiencies of conversion of 3% to 400/0. 
Philip Sporn (2) 
Ebery improvement in the efficiency of the production 
or utilisation of energy has encouraged the 
substitution of fixed for working capital. In a sense, 
the story of power is the story of industrialisation ... 
[The] proliferation and diffusion of electrical 
equipment, which is f a  from exhausted, goes back to 
the decades before the First World War. There was now 
no activity that could not be mechanised and powered. 
This was the consummation of the Industrial Revolution. 
David S. Landes (3) 
Using research and technology, capitalist industrialization transforms the labour 
process to increase capital accumulation and to maintain political class domination. 
In the labour process under capitalism, man acts in nature to produce not merely the 
commodities necessary for his reproduction, but also surplus value to be appropriated 
as capital. Industrialization involves increasing the technical composition of 
capital, which is the relation between the mass of means of production and the mass 
of labour necessary for their employment in the labour process. (4) Surplus value 
accumulated from past generations is embodied increasingly as constant capital, as 
means of production, for the labour process of the present generation. In the labour 
process, if the time taken for the production of the goods and services necessary for 
the reproduction of labour is reduced, then more, or relative surplus value, may be 
appropriated as capital. Industrializafion reduces this necessary labour time in a 
revolutionary way by increasingly using YnanhateT1 energy sources powering machinery. 
llThe production of absolute surplus value turns exclusively upon the length of the 
working day; the production of relative susplus value revolutionizes out and out the 
technical processes of labour, aMd the composition of society." (5) Rephrased in 
simple, reductionist, South African terms, "A coal-cutter probably saves forty 
natives". (6) 
A benefit to the capitalist of at least equal importance accompanies this 
"labour savingf1. Industrialization brings much greater capitalist control of the 
labour process. Machines are used to intervene in man-nature relations to ensure that 
I 
I m-m relations are reproduced on terms favourable to capitalism. Man-nature l 
I relations may be termed the forces of production, while man-man relations, or property I relations, the division of society into owning and working classes (among others), may I be termed the relations of production. Forces and relations of production form an 
exceedingly complex unity (7) within which internally related classes conflict 
dialectically with one another. (8) Capitalist industrialization introduces machinery 
into this complex unity of forces and relations of production, as a weapon in class 
conflict on the side of the owning classes, to maintain political class domination 
as well as to increase relative surplus value. Above all, political class domination 
mst be maintained at the level of the economic. ( 9 )  Capitalists use the disciplines 
and skills of machines, at this level, as substitutes for the withdrawable skills and 
calculated indisciplines of their class enemies, the workers. Hobson wrote: 1: 
Machinery can also register and regulate the expenditure 
of human power. Babbage well says 'One of the most 
singular advantages we derive from machinery is in the 
check which it affords against the inattention, the 
idleness or the knavery of human agents. l(l0) 
In similar vein Braverman writes: 4 
Machinery comes into the world not as the servant of I 
humanity but as the instrument of those to whom I 
accumulation of capital gives the ownership of machines. 
The capacity of humans to control the labour process I 
through machinery is seized upon by management from the I 
beginning of capitalism as the prime means whereby 
I l production may be controlled not by the direct producers I 
but by the owners of capital. (11) l 
Industrialization totally reorganizes society; it is an ongoing revolution. 
It involves demographic shifts to towns, and specialization, or division of labour. 
It creates wholly new mechanized industries, and it mechanizes old ones. Major change 
occurs in financial institutions and in the circulation of capital. Industrialization 
involves large-scale concentration of people, materials and institutions. Yet, above 
all, it involves mechanization using "inanimatet1 energy, and it occurs to serve 
capitalists in their struggle. It does not primarily result from ltnationalism", nor 
from the need to provide jobs for the unemployed, although both of these may well be 
secondary, overdetermining factors. Neither is technology the fundamental cause. 
"The primary determinant of basic choices with regard to the organization of production 
has not been technology - exogenous and inexorable - but the exercise of power - I 
endogenous and resistable. The steam mill didnl t give us the capitalist, the l 
capitalist gave us the steam mill.ll (12) Therefore, in South Africa, or in any other 
capitalist social formation, it is to the exercise by capitalists of domination in the 
class struggle, and to their desire for increased surplus appropriation, that we must 
look if we are to find both the local and the imperial origins of industrialization.(13) 
While the origins of industrialization are to be found in the class struggle, 
its indices include statistics on the use of machinery, on time devoted to research 
and development of technology, and on the use of energy. Knowledge and 
"inanimatet1 energy are essential to the mechanization of the labour process. Thus, 
according to Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk: 
In the last resort all our productive efforts amount to 
shiftings and combinations of matter. We must know how 
to bring together the right forms of matter at the right 
moment, in order that from those associated forces the 
desired result, the product wanted, may follow.. . There 
are natural powers which far exceed the possibilities of 
human power in greatness... If we can succeed in making 
these factors our allies, in the work of production, the 
limits of human possibility will be indefinitely extended. (14) 
Similarly, Hobson wrote: 
For most purposes of organized industry the use of some 
non-human energy is necessary: civilisation more andmore 
implies the liberation of the ~nuscular and nervous powers of 
man from heavy routine work, and the substitution of rnechmical 
energy. In large provinces of industry the time has 
come when the success or failure of a man to establish 
himself in business, and to make a living wage or profit, 
depends on the terms on which he can obtain cheap and 
reliable access to this energy. (15) 
To industrialize in the early twentieth century, what sources of inanimate energy 
could be harnessed? What combinations of matter, what forces of production needed to 
be researched and assembled? Seriously to increase the technical composition of 
capital in the early twentieth century, as leaders from Henry Ford to Jan Smuts to 
Lewin realized, required mobilization of productive forces together with research 
howledge in the coal, iron and steel, railway and electric power industries, to which 
list chemicals and & were being added. The embodiment of dead labour, as machinery 
in Department I, as wage goods in Department 11, or as luxuries in Department 111, 
required a transport network for assembling the required materials and live labour; 
it required an increasing variety of materials to represent the dead labour as the 
substance of the commodity produced; it required an energy source to move the 
machinery, to keep dead labour spinning in its pave, so that the rate of exploitation 
of live labour could be increased. 
In most social foxmations in the early twentieth century the transport form 
was railways, the essential materials were iron and steel, and the inanimate energy 
sources were water, oil, or coal, with coal as king. Any of these energy sources 
turned into electricity would be far more useful in most industries. On their own 
initiative or in the face of the fierce worker resistance and strikes of the early 
twentieth centmy, or both, capitalists won the economic class struggle, and hence 
the overall political class struggle, in many countries - but not in all - by 
mobilizing research, technology, transport, iron and steel and electricity. Thus were 
workers disciplined and capital accunniLation increased. Monopoly capital reproduced 
itself using technology which enabled the creation of a new, more favourable universe 
for capitalists. This was done consciously. Werner Sombart wrote in his book, The 
Quintessence of Modern Capitalism: 
Technical improvements in our day have developed beyond 
the dreams of man. They have liberated applied science 
from the organised forces of nature, so that it can now 
utilize the energy which the sun has stored up deep down 
in the earth. Applied science no longer looks to men of 
flesh and blood for its achievements: it relies upon 
dead matter and mechanical power for its achievement. 
What is the result? Technical improvements lulow no 
bounds; they make possible what was inconceivable 
before, they create the universe anew. Nor must we 
forget the many-sidedness of technical knowledge. hrery 
day produces something new and so creates a need for a 
new form of organisation. That only expands the 
possibility of the Capitalist spirit. (16) 
A long view of the twentieth century demonstrated how the "capitalist spiritI1was 
fostered using technology. Early steps in mechanization led to automation of labour 
processes, from .-Tokyo to Bimingbam. By the final quarter of the century, "the use 
of automation and automatic control is increasing at the rate of an exponential 
development curve. This means that the rate is constantly augmenting". (17) 
Similarly, early technological research, from Cape Town to San Francisco, developed 
so that research is now the sine qua non for capitalist enterprise. "The industry 
which has not learnt to employ scientists to make it new, keep it new, is doomed.ll (18) 
Early twentieth century industrialization formed the crucial base for the ongping 
technological revolution of later years. It enabled capitalists, with the help of 
some wars and some advice from M r  Keynes, to discover the joys of industrial planning 
as a partial control on the anarchy of capitalist competition. Planned industrialization 
also meant capitalists could pre-empt labour conflicts and problems. Energy supplies 
became more and more important, so that control of energy flows gave capitalists a 
feeling of control over the future. Their major ideologist in this field is worth 
citing at some lemgth: 
Beyond the next year or two the most important elements 
that determine electricity loads are not those that 
happen,but those that we project, that we invent - in 
the broad sense of the word invention. You have control 
over such loads, you invent them and make them come into 
being, and then you can make plans for the best manner 
of meeting them. If this kind of thinking is adopted, 
and then sequentially followed with plans, technologic, 
economic and commercial, this new load will come into 
being as a result of planned effort and will be met with 
in accordance with predetermined design. What can be 
done technologically is perhaps the most important single 
element, but not the only element, in determining what 
can be done to achieve growth. Thus out of the close ties 
between invention and technology, between technology and 
expansion in use, there exists a perfectly logical base 
for the claim that the future can be invented. (19) 
So capitalists now attempt to invent the future by planned control of energy 
flows, by planned industrialization. The tendency to mechanization, Marxls !'law of the 
progressive increase in constant capital in proportion to the variable" (20), is now 
planned. The whole of the twentieth century, from its earliest decades, has been 
spent learning the techniques of this planning. Yet the only absolute law (i.e. 
tendency) of the capitalist mode of production is the production of surplus value.(21) 
Planned or not, the tendency to mechanization is a relative law, and works itself out 
in contradiction with another consequence of the absolute law of the (competitive) 
production of surplus value, which is the law of the uneven development of 
capitalism (22), also a relative law. Competition to augment individual capitals, by 
producing surplus value, even under partial planning by monopoly capital, results in 
compe.titive, uneven industrialization,in anarchic 'mechanization. Capitalism's 
"inherent laws impose themselves only as the mean of apparently lawless irregularities 
that compensate one anotherf1. (23) 
Especially at the peripheries of Ehpire, the law of the increasing technical 
composition of capital is mediated by the law of the uneven development of capitalism. 
Imperial monopolies oppose industrialization of the periphery. Yet they compete with 
themselves, so finance capital might industrialize the periphery in competition with 
metropolitan producers and merchants, for the law of the progressive increase of 
constant capital operates in response to resistance offered by workers at the periphery 
as well as at the centre. In mature empires, with declining metropolitan staple 
industries and the increasing importance of finance capital (24), peripheral 
industrialization and capital formation mi&t well thrive. This occurred in the case 
of Britain and South Africa in the twentieth century, yet to this day they are married 
by the bonds of finance capital. 
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11. Smuts and the Crises of the First World War 
In the early years South African capitalism and the South African capitalist 
state were far less certain of their ability to "invent the future" than the 
ideologists at the forefront of capitalism were in later times. Industrialization 
implies not only the mechanization of existing production but also the creation of 
new mechanized industry in places where none existed before. This meets with fierce 
metropolitan competition when attempted by a colony, or even a dominion. South ' Africa's role as a producer of the money metal for the mire, and as a produce 
that other rqystical store of value, diamonds, did not exempt her from the genera %Of 
duties of peripheral states of the mire. "When we analyse the prices of what Britain 
imports from the colonies and what it exports to them, the figures will always show 
1 an inequality in the expenditure of labour on the two masses of goods exchanged as 
equivalents." (25)  Before World War I, South Africa exported largely unprocessed raw 
materials, minerals and agricultural products, in unequal exchange for the machines, 
manufactured wage goods and luxuries which were imported from the rest of the Bnpire, 
I mainly from Britain. 
l 
i 
Nevertheless, before World War I, there existed a South African capitalism, 
l linked to British finance capital, and there existed a South African capitalist state, 
already a dominion rather than an underdeveloped colony like the Gold Coast. The 
South African state was itself a major monopoly capitalist. The state monopoly railway 
system had a budget equal to the central state budget. Under prompting from the state, 
in response to the crises of the First World War, to the decline of the staple 
l industries in Britain, and above all to the fierce struggles put up by workers in 
South Africa, both black and white, South Africa mechanized and industrialized, giving 
capitalists there a somewhat greater ability to "invent the futuret1. The importance 
of strikes, and of worker resistance to increasing exploitation, as the central spurs 
I to mechanization and industrialization, is reflected in the ideological patterns at 
the time of the war. Belinda Bozzoli writes: "Until the w a r  the central economic 
need for protection had given rise to a particular ideological pattern; now protection 
be- to move into the background, and employer-employee relationships into the 
foreground. " (26)  
The proposition that the South African state -er Botha and Smuts was 
opposed to industrialization would be seriously misconceived. They represented 
capitalists, when capitalists needed to industrialize. Smuts was no career colonial 
governor, and even colonial governors, like Guggisberg in the Gold Coast, have been 
known to undertake rudimentary industrialization programmes. Smuts was a dominion 
prime minister, and together with Lionel Curtis, Phillip Kerr and the Round Table had 
been responsible for popularizing the term "British Commonwealth of Nations", which 
was something more than mere rhetoric and reflected the material flstrer&h, independence 
and nationhood" (27) which states like Canada, Australia and South Africa had attained, 
by comparison with, for example, the Gold Coast Colony. The war brought few changes 
to the colonial empire; it brought vast changes to the dominions, which gained 
new powers. 
Like the Australian state in New Guinea, the South African state under Botha 
and Smuts became a major sub-imperial power in its own right. In a war which depended 
largely on the South African Railway resources for which he had campaigned so hard at 
I the time of Union, Smuts conquered a territory which waa the size of Britain and France / taken together. He thereby obtained for South African capital not only rich farming, 
fishing and base mineral industries and a large labour reserve in Ovamboland, but 
also the world's richest diamond fields. Allied with Australia in the horse-trading 
at the Paris Peace Conference, Smuts "flew in the face of the whole civilised world" 
to hold the territory for South African capital. Smuts invented the mandates system 
to save Wilsonfs face from total destruction, and used the weakest "Cl1 class mandate 
as the front behind which he in fact retained his colony. The agreement reflects the 
position clearly: it was decided that 
a mandate should be conferred upon His Britannic 
Majesty to be exercised on his behalf by the 
Government of the Union of South Africa to 
administer the territory. (28 )  
The not so llsomnsunbulent kleptomania of warsv should not be forgotten as a 
source of capital accumulation, and South African capitalists, linked to their 
Britannic Majestiest finance capitalists, have profited by their colony ever since. 
The state made a large amount of money from the sale of seized diamonds in 1917 (29), 
and, after the war, that most South African of the mining houses, Ernest Oppenheimerls 
Anglo-American Corporation, monopolized the diamond fields. (30) Sixty years later 
profits made in the colony make a major contribution to the South African balance of 
payments. Smuts served South African capitalists as by his conquest, bringing in many 
new and profitable industries as well as a captive market for South African 
industrialization. 
Smuts and Botha were not only inrportant sub-imperialists. They represented 
finance and monopoly capital at a time when labour strife and capitalist competition 
provided major incentives to mechanize, both in mining and in other industries. 
Simultaneously, the combined production, finance and transport crises of the war 
removed British industrial and merchant capitalists from the market, thus enabling 
industrialization. After the war, and despite the depression, the South African state 
continued to foster industrialization, although under Smuts it would not do so in a 
wag which might seriously harm the interests of the gold mines. The Pact were more 
prepared to take this risk, but even they, as we shall see, were loth to kill the 
golden goose. 
Smuts a3ld Botha represented South African monopoly mining and agricultural 
capital, linked to British finance capital. They did&, as we shall see, represent 
British iron barons. Provided the interests of the gold mines were not seriously 
affected, British finance capital had little reason to oppose South African 
industrialization, and indeed profited by it. British industrial capital in the old 
staple industries of ffVictorimff Britain certainly opposed peripheral industrialization. 
For a host of reasons, the British staple industries were declining, willy-nilly. 
However, they put up a fight which delayed the creation of a South African steel works 
by a decade. In respect of this, Kuczynski writes: 
The effect of the first world war on conditions in the 
British m i r e  was not inconsiderable. Industry in the 
Dominions strengthened markedly, although it would be 
wrong to say that the Dominions became industrially 
independent, as most of the countries in Western Europe 
were... The small beginnings towards the creation of a 
heavy industry in the Dominions were largely suppressed 
after the war. (31) 
However, the Bperial state decided in the war that development of the 
Finpire 1 S resources, and peripheral industrialization, were strategically wise. (32) 
Not all British industrial capitalists opposed industry in the dominions: m m y  stood 
to gain by it, like large machinery manufacturers who could equip the new factories. 
Wineering consultants like Merz and McLellan made large fortunes selling British 
tenchology throughout the mire. (33) In sum, British capital was not monolithic, 
but divided between those who would lose and those who would gain by industrialization 
of the mire. Therefore both Smuts and Botha, and on occasion the Imperial state 
itself, could foster industrialization in South Africa. 
111. Railwa~rs, Coal and Electricity in South African Industrialization 
Smuts and Botha went to the Nationaz Convention with elaborate proposals for 
the creation of a state monopoly railway transport industry, whose specific duty was 
to be "agricultural and industrial development within the Union, and the promotion by 
means of cheap transport of the settlement of an agricultural and industrial 
population in the inland portions of the unionff, as Section 129 of the resulting Act 
of Union phrased it. (34) The SAR & H Administration, under Sir William Hay, took 
this injunction very seriously. (35) To bless the awkward marriage of South African 
mining and agriculture, railway rating policies favoured the carriage of raw materials 
to the Rand (36), thus ensuring the location of industry on the Rand close to the 
markets. This policy succeeded: by 1949, just under half of all the large factories 
of the country were in the Southern Transvaal, despite its relative lack of water. (37) 
Smuts and Botha's policies favoured the concentration of people and goods which is so 
essential to industrialization, and in doing so they created the only monopoly in the 
country capable of matching the mining industry in scope. 
Prompted by the special circumstances of a fragment of mining capital (38) 
and by the enormous advantages in efficiency promised by railway electrification (39), 
Boy's railways went further to industrialize South Africa. If Transvaal coal was the 
Cinderella of South African mining, dominated by the three ugly sisters of the SAR, 
the Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Company and, above all, the gold mines (40), 
then Natal coal was the fifth and youngest sister, oppressed even by Cinderella, and 
with her wares trapped behind the Valley of a Thousand Hills, very expensive railway 
country. (41) Paced with the alternatives of electrification of railwqys or doubling 
the main Natal lines from the coalfields to the coast, Hoy chose the first, and 
eventually both were achieved. He made his choice not only to mechanize the railways 
but explicitly to foster other industrialisation (42), and he did it with the active 
support of Smuts. Hoy's attempts at electrification were stopped in 1914 by the war, 
but by 1917 he was able to appoint Merz and McLellan of London to investigate the 
electrification of the SAR. (43) From their reports (44) came not only the 
electrification of part of the Natal line and the Cape suburban lines by 1925/26, 
itself a large state industrialization programme with investment on a scale greater 
than that of any private investment project outside of gold mining (45), but also the 
creation of another large new industry in the shape of the Electricity Supply 
Commission. (46) This was set up with the explicit duty of supplying energy at the 
cheapest possible cost, with the pwpose of fostering industrialization. (47) The 
gold mines already had a huge power supply industry in the VETPC, whose system in 
1917 was one of the four largest in the world. (48) However, at that time, the VFTPC 
did little to foster other industrialization, although it did supply some Reef towns 
and some big industrial customers. (49) Hoy and Smuts, together with Sir Robert Kotze, 
the Government Mining Engineer, put the Electricity Act through Parliament, in 1922, 
and thereby immeasurably increased the possibilities of industrialization. (50) Smuts 
hacl already brought back H. J. van der Bijl, son of an old Transvaal friend, and a 
successful scientist in America, to fill the post of Scientific and Technical 
Adviser - itself a post created by the Smuts government to foster industrialization.(51) 
In 1923 van der Bijl became Chairman of ESCOM, and went on, until his death in 1948, 
to become South Africa's most successful industrial entrepreneur. (53) The importance 
of ESCOM's cheap power in the history of South African industrialization cannot be 
overstressed. If "the story of power is the story of industrialization", if 
electricity "was the consummation of the Industrial Revolution" (541, then let it be 
remembered that it was the state under Smuts , not the state under the Pace (55), that 
created ESCOM, and for good reasons: the goals were increases in the technical 
composition of capital, and increased discipline of the work force in the labour 
process, so that increased capital accumulation could take place. Smuts acted for 
monopoly capital, and therefore the state under his leadership fostered the railww, 
coal and electricity industries. (56) 
Space allows for only one example of the results of the ongoing industrial 
revolution in the transport industry brought about by electrification devised by the 
state under Smuts. In 1934 Phillip Olimani, "Secretary of Docks Workers" in Cape 
Town, wrote to their MP, Walter Bowen: 
Since 1925 as Dock Workers there is no more work for 
us, in connection with the carrying of bags of mealies 
and working with the coal. Now there is no more 
mealies going overseas and no more coal for engines, 
as electric trains are now being used all over the 
Peninsula. We are now four years out of work, 
starvation is upon us and we are at the same time 
ordered to p w  under the Pass Law although we are not 
working. (57) 
Bowen eventually received a reply from the Office of the Minister of Railways: 
During recent years the demand for native labour at 
Table Bay Docks has decreased to a considerable extent, 
this being attributable to the falling off in two 
particular lines of export business, namely coaling and 
the handling of bagged export grain . . . The coal 
business is not expected, even with the generally 
improved conditions, to reach anything like the 
previous figures, and aqy alteration in the policy to 
discourage the conveyance of maize in bags would be to 
the detriment of the elevator system. (58) 
The switch to more efficient oil-fired ships had hit the coal trade as much 
as the state's electrification of railways. The grain elevator system was also 
introduced by the state under Smuts, before 1925. Throwing hundreds of dock workers 
out of work increased the pool of labour on which capitalists throughout the country 
could draw, thus lowering the bargaining position of all workers in their struggle. 
It may be argued that pumping coal is so hard and dirty a task that it should be 
mechanized or avoided, which in a happier society might be true. We must not make 
the mistakes of Luddism. However, we should remember Sheila Rowbotham's words on 
unemployment: 
It is one of the most bitter and terrible ironies of 
capitalism that, dreadful and soul-destroying as it 
is to work, it is even worse to be forcibly prevented 
from labour. The exploited are the lucky ones. The 
others are worn out and scrap because they are not 
even needed to make profits. (59) 
The State under Smuts effectively "scrapped" large classes of workers in 
its industrialization programmes, but thereby it _did industrialize. H. J. van der 
Bijl saw that lltwo of the most important agents that contribute towards the building 
up of an industrial structure are transport a.nd electric power". (60) He, and other 
state functionaries like the Secretary for Mines, H. Worington-Smythe, like Hoy and 
like Kotze, with the active support of Smuts, dramatically improved both industries 
in South Africa. Both depended on coal or oil. Coal-fired electric power stations 
revolutionized the state rai1wa;y system; oil-fieed internal combustion engines 
simultaneously revolutionized road transport. The mechanization of coal mines 
continued apace. Partly because of the geological nature of the deposits, but also 
because of worker struggle and competition from gold mines for labour, South Africa 
was among the leaders of coal-mine mechanization. In 1913 some 6P/0 of American coal 
was cut by hand, as was 913/0 of British coal. After the war, in 1920, only 20% of 
South African coal was cut by hand; in 1925 only 1Pb; by 1930 only 6%. (61) 
Although some back-breaking tasks in railways, electricity production and coal mining 
were eliminated by mechanization, the general effect of the industrialization of these 
three industries was deleterious on the condition of labour in its conflict with 
capital. 
IV. Smuts and Delfos versus the "Fhplish Iron Mastersm...(62) 
I 
, The "opposition" strenuously opposed the creation of a state-owned iron and 
1 steel industry in 1928, perhaps among other reasons because they feared a substantial 
rise in the price of steel to the gold mines. (63) It cannot be inferred from this 
that they were opposed to the creation of an iron and steel industry in South Africa, 
either than or when they were in office before the 1924 elections. (64) Instead, 
convinced of the potential for a steel industry, Smuts went to great lengths in 1922 
to obtain finance in England for the most important of the steel projects, that which 
was energetically put forward by C. F. Delfos. (65) He failed in his attempt to 
obtain capital from the British Treasury for the project, but the bounties scheme 
which he introduced under the Iron and Steel Industry Encouragement Act of 1922 was 
sufficiently viable for it to be acceptable even to the Pact as late as 1926, who 
adopted it in that year as a strategy for financing the much-desired industry. (66) 
Only a year later, when all else had failed, did the conflict over state-ownership 
become the key issue. Among the opponents of state-ownership in that year were 
important sections of South African "national" capital, including not only 
competitors of Delfosts SAISC Ltd (which became ISCOR) such as the Union Steel 
Corporation and Dunswarts Iron & Steel, but also Gearing and Laite of the SA 
Federated Chamber of Industries (67), a group that had been campaigning for South 
African industrialization for many years, but which now feared State competition to 
private industry. Earlier, Delfos's SAISC Ltd had even been financed to some extent 
by the National Industrial Corporation, a subsidiary of the National Bank of South 
Africa, and by the Central Mining and Investment Corporation and the Anglo-American 
Corporation. (68) Lionel Phillips of Central Mining had at first been advised 
against a South African steel industry, then had changed his mind, by which time the 
English Iron lhsters had ensured a total lack of capital for the project. Delfos 
wrote to Smuta in 1921: 
My opinion is that the Central Mining and Investment 
Corporation cannot possibly raise the capital at 
present ... It will be necessary to get big financial 
interests from outside South Africa. It seems hardly 
possible that we should get very substantial support 
from Great Britain because in the first place they 
will require all the money they have available for 
their own industries, and besides many parties 
interested in the British Iron and Steel Industry have 
been opposed to the establishment of such an Industry 
in South Africa because this would mean that they were 
going to lose part of their own market. M r  B u y  is not 
of the same opinion because he looks at the question 
from a broad Imperial point of view and states that 
whenever such (ore) deposits are within the Ehpire they 
should be developed. (69) 
This broad Imperial point of view was in the interests of certain sections 
of British capital, and an institution existed in Britain which arranged Treasury 
loans for the purchase by Dominions of industrial plants provided they were b o w t  in 
Britain. (70) The Trade Facilities Board was prepared to arrang'e a loan to Delfos, 
the major British beneficiary of which would be Amstrong Whitworths, but some form 
of backing from the South African state was needed before Treasury approval could be 
obtained. (71) The State Mining Commission, headed by P. Ross-Frames, a leading 
mining capitalist, had recommended a Bounties System as early as 1918, to attract 
capital for iron and steel, based on the precedent set by Canada. (72) In 1922 Smuts 
adopted the Iron and Steel Encouragement Act, with the approval of the Board of Trade 
and Industries, and of the Scientific and Technical Adviser, offering bounties in 
respect of production by any plant with a capacity of over 50,000 tons. (73) By 
stipulating the large-scale, Ehmts was once more fostering South African monopoly 
capital: the object was to ffinsure that bounties [would] not be granted to small 
temporary undertakings". (74) There followed a complicated period of lobbying in 
London, in which Smuts gave enthusiastic support to Delfos. Smuts telegrammed to the 
Hi& Commissioner: 
I understand Trade Facilities Company [sic] doubt 
whether to proceed with their offer as industry will 
compete with British industries. This is mistake as 
factory will supply only small portion of South African 
requirements and in any case finished goods will 
continue to be largely imported. Please give Delfos 
all support you can in representations. I am anxious 
that industry should succeed, and Union Government are 
pledged by law to very large bounties in support of it. 
You should endeavour to secure support of Mr Churchill. (75) 
Delfos won his battle at the Trade Facilities Board concerning the tecnhical 
possibilities, but other considerations entered into it. Delfos wrote to his Head 
Office in Pretoria: 
Trade Facilities have referred the matter to Cabinet 
for their decision of whether assistance is justifiable 
in view of the detrimental effect of the development of 
South African industry on British exports. I argued 
that the development of the steel industry means the 
development of the country and consequently the 
increase of (~ritish) exports regarding the total 
amount, although iron and steel products exports will 
be reduced, but as we produce only 7&!h of the total 
amount of imports of iron and steel goods this should 
not influence the decision adversely. (76) 
With hindsigkt, the result is more predictable than it was at the time: 
The Treasury here turned Delfos down, and privately I 
have heard that the argument against him ... is that 
the establishment of Delfos's scheme with money voted 
for the purpose of lessening unemployment in (~ritain) 
is going to set up a competitor which will cause loss 
of trade here, and consequently further unemployment. 
Of course, this latter argument is a very big stick in 
the hands of the labour agitator and also in the hands 
of local manufacturers in this country who will raise 
the bogy of competition, and Churchill and company, I 
was told, are not prepared to face these gentlemen in 
Parliament. (77) 
Nevertheless, further attempts were made: 
There is no question about it - had it not been for the 
likelihood of getting a loan from the Trade Facilities 
Board we would never have gone so far with the Bonus 
legislation and I must SW it will be a great 
disappointment to us all. I hope you will be able to 
use your influence with the Technical Advisers of the 
Colonial Office and shew them that we are being rather 
let down by this eleventh hour retirement. The fact 
that it is thought that we will compete with the Ehglish 
Iron Masters is quite wrong because after all we are 
only going to deal with the rough article, much of which 
comes from Belgium and America, and all finished work 
will continue as heretofore to be imported. (78) 
This was of no avail. llTreasury again refusing Delfos. l1 (79) Thus Smuts and Delfos 
lost their battle with the "Ehglish Iron Masters", not for want of trying, and not 
especially because of strong opposition from mining capital, which seems to have been 
divided on the issue at this time. Fear of higher prices to consumers was not 
necessarily important. The largest consumers of iron and steel were not the mines but 
the railways (80), and Sir William Hoy of the SAR & H administration was prepared to 
give great assistance to the campaign for a local steel industry. (81) 
In his study of the South African iron and steel industry, C. S. Richards 
notes that Taussig wrote "iron is the foundation of the material apparatus of 
civilisation". (82) This may be rephrased: "iron is the foundation of the embodiment 
of dead labour as constant capital in the labour process; iron has been the material 
necessary for the increasing technical composition of capital." Therefore it is no 
surprise that the South African capitalist state energetically attempted to create an 
iron and steel industry before 1925. It failed, but the research which it initiated, 
especially the Gutehoffnungshiitte Report, commissioned as a result of Smtsls 
instructions to Karl Spilhaus, Union Trade Commissioner on the continent, was of 
crucial importance to the establishment of the industry after 1928 (83) - when 
H. J. van der Bijl becase its first Chairman, in addition to his chairmanship of 
ESCOM. (84) 
V. Research 
Research is essential for industrialization. (85) As a Dominion, rather 
than a simple colony, South Africa had centres of research in her higher education 
institutes. In 1922 the School of Mines and Technology became the University of the 
Witwatersrand, to be South Africa's most important centre of research, in time. The 
change in name perhaps represents a material c-, as research and teaching moved 
slowly away from the interests of mining, pure and simple, to the interests of an 
integrated expanding econolny - not that llWitsll ever stopped serving the interests of 
the mine-owners. More importantly, the state apparatuses themselves researched 
industrialization from 1915 to 1925. In this period the Advisory Board of Industries 
asld Science, the Research Grant Board, the Board of Trade and Industries, the 
Scientific and Technical Adviser, the Industries Section of the Department of Mines 
and Industries, and the South African Journal of Industries were all created to foster 
South African industrialization by research. Their activities were far-reaching and 
of great influence, as were those of the research sections of the railways 
administration a,nd of ESCOM. Lack of space prevents a detailed account here (86), 
but two points must be made: firstly, their acticities axe too extensive to be 
treated as simple "window-dressing" for a government concerned with the interests of 
mining and mercantile capital which supposedly oppose local industrialization (87), 
and, secondly, doubt must be cast on the suggestion that the Industries section was 
understaffed so that industrialization would not be fostered. In an overdetemined 
system, that may be one explanation among many and need not be primary. Certainly 
the Industries section could have received greater funds. In moving from the post of 
Scientific and Technical Adviser to that of Chairman of ESCOM, Dr van der Bijl 
reported: 
the time I have been in charge of the Industries 
division has been a trying and to me a very 
disappointing one. I realise that the country has 
been in a difficult financial position during the 
past two or three years, but at the same time I feel 
that the Government should make a special effort . . . (88) 
In his protracted struggle with the Public Service Commission and the 
Treasury for staff and money (89) during the post-war slump, van der Bijl was 
essentially a Keynesian before Keynes. He was struggling with a decwed economic 
orthodoxy, of which Hobsbawm reminds us: 
We tend to forget how small and uninfluential a 
minority (the ~eynesians) were, until after the 
economic catastrophe had become so overwhelming ... 
The baakers and the officials who were the guam3ia.n~ 
of Treasury orthodoxy dreamed of a return to the liberal 
world of 1913, put their confidence in balanced budgets 
and the Bank Rate ... The economists, with what can only 
be described as a quiet heroism worthy of Don Quixote, 
nailed their flag to the mast of Say's Law which proved 
that slumps could not actually occur at all. Never did 
a ship founder with a captain and a crew more ignorant 
of the reasons for its misfortune or more impotent to do 
anything about it. (90) 
We should not be too surprised if, in the 1922 slump, van der Bijl's 
heretical, ambitious policies, of greatly increased expenditure and activity by the 
state, were opposed by Treasury bureaucrats at every opportunity. What is more 
interesting is that in the upswing of 1923 Smuts gave him ESCOM, and he rapidly 
achieved an agreement concerning the Witbank power station so that the huge benefits 
of the economies of scale made possible by the gold mines could be passed on to other 
industries through the electricity system. 
VI. Protection 
The accepted orthodoxy is that the Pact gave a great boost to local industry 
with the 1925 Customs Tariff Act. This orthodoxy contains a kernel of truth, yet 
perhaps exaggerates the case. Increased protection did assist industrialization, 
especially in the production of some two dozen selected commodities, yet the degree 
of protection was generally not very high, and South Africa remained a relatively open 
economy for a long period after 1925. Other factors, such as cheap unskilled labour 
and cheap energy, must be given due credit. 
Tariff protection predates 1925: the first consolidated Union tariff was 
introduced in 1914 and increased in 1915, to be altered at intervals thereafter. The 
Smuts government satisfied protectionists and free-traders (91) with a policy of 
selective tariffs to protect particular industries. (92) C. S. Richards conceives of 
vlnatural'l protection, in the form of freight, insurance, landing charges, revenue 
tariff S and railage, while explicitly protective tariff S are "unnatural". (93) This 
is less than helpful, because railage, like the other charges, has no Aquinianjusta 
retium, no "God-given" price determined by an "a-political", "free" market. Railage 
Tariffs were used before Union to protect local industry (94). and, altho- free- 
traders attempted to eliminate this, the attempt was not successful. (95) It is likely 
that for some goods railage was a far more important protection than any 1925 tariff 
could be. (96) The 1925 Act had a very low incidence on goods destined for agriculture, 
and was generally low on mining supplies (97) other than blankets (98) and drill 
equipment. Aside from goods like blankets, almost totally eliminated from the list 
of imports, the increase in tariff incidence after 1925 was small, as Table One (99) 
shows. 
TABLE ONE 
Percentage Ratios of Total Value of Customs Collections 
to Total Value of Imports on Commercial Account 
The increases due to the 1925 Act were tiny compared to the much greater 
explicitly revenue tariffs levied to save a near-bankrupt state treasury in the 
depression, nnd even the revenue tariffs were not highly protective, as a large revenue 
duty was levied on petrol, which accounts for much of the increase shown in Table 
One. (100) Simply, at least until the Second World War, South African tariff 
protection was at most only "moderate", the word used by HM Trade Commissioners. (101) 
Protective tariffs as incentives to industrialization in South Africa must be viewed 
in that light. It is possible that Fabius Cunctator would not be too disappointed at 
the Pactls attempts to close South Africa to foreign competition: Australials tariff 
incidence at the time was of the order of 2007 (102), compared to the Pact's 13%. 
In sum: the Pact's protective policies were not unimportant in fostering 
industrialization, but from 1912 to 1925 under Smuts and Botha both customs and railage 
protection also fostered some selected industries, to a greater or lesser extent. 
Nevertheless, protection cannot be seen as the single most important factor in South 
African industrialization,for the tariffs were seldom high enough. Ian Drummond 
concludes "South African tariffs were low, and . . . few were overtly protective". (103) 
VII. Conclusion 
Lack of space prevented analysis here of the "triumph" achieved by Smuts 
and the mine-owners in the 1922 strike, when white wages were significantly reduced 
and. white employment dropped. (104) This was also a process of industrialization: 
it enabled further mechanization and "rationalisation1' of the labour process, so that 
electricity consumed per worker in the mines rose from 3601 kilowatt hours in 1920 
to 4522 kilowatt hours per worker in 1924, and tonnes of rock treated per worker rose 
from l13 tonnes in 1920 to 134.7 tonnes in 1924. (105) In another way, the state 
under Smuts also industrialized the gold production process with the establishment of 
the South African Mint. (106) 
The state under Smuts and Botha was capitalist, subject to the relative 
tendency of capitalism to increase the technical composition of capital, thus 
industrializing. Between 1915 and 1925 serious industrialization attempts were made 
in the key industries of transport, energy, and iron and steel. By research, and in 
a number of other ways, industrialization was also fostered by the state in other 
fields. The implications of this for the question of where "hegemony" lay (107) before 
and after the 1924 elections (if elections can be seen as transferring mhegemonyu, 
which is doubtful) have not been explicitly examined here. Perhaps a clearer answer 
to this question must await specification, in much greater detail, of the complexities 
contained within those broad (and perhaps un-Marxian) categories of "mining", "foreign11, 
llagricultural" and capital. Dialectical theory dictates that "mining1' and 
"foreign" capital, indeed all capital, must contain contradictions. Hegemony cannot 
be useful as a static concept which, by stating that a state will never at the global 
level do anything which goes against the "interests" of the hegemonic fraction, 
somehow eliminates the contradictions contained within that hegemonic fraction. As a 
m i c ,  dialectical concept it may well be useful, but its application requires great 
rigour both at the level of theory and in the thorough illumination of the material 
social formation, to which this essay has been but a small initial contribution. Yet, 
in considering "hegemony" and industrialization after 1924, the remarks of Cresswell 
about his Hertzogite colleagues in the "PactT1 should be recalled: 
They have very little first-hand howledge of the facts 
and the problems of industrial life. (108) 
The nature of South African agricultural capital, and. its relatiolis with 
industrialization, have yet to be spelt out for this period. 
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